Thursday, 16 January 2020

Able Archer-83, The Cold War, and Lessons for the Current Iran Crisis—Four


For my friends and foes, I have a disclaimer about this set of postings. I am squarely in the middle politically, religiously, and socially. I have no axes to grind. However, I do heartily believe in the truth or my version of it based on research for as objective a point of view as is possible. The facts are the facts in this work you are about to read, but the opinions are mine. In short, I believe the Able-archer-83 saga was a harbinger of things to come, and we ignore the lesson as it may apply to the current escalation of belligerence occurring between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran at our peril. I pray for the leaders involved that no one inadvertently pulls the atomic trigger. The Able Archer-83 exercise [culmination of Exercise Autumn Forge] was just that, an exercise. The hypothesis underlying the large military exercises was fictional, albeit something like well written historical fiction; some realities of the Cold War antagonisms were reflected in the scenario. The massive exercise involved 40,000 U.S. and NATO troops moving across western Europe, coordinated by encrypted communications systems. The planning included a scenario with the hypothetical opponent [Orange—fairly obviously the Warsaw Pact countries] opening hostilities in all regions of ACE [Allied Command Europe] on November 4, 1983, including numerous UK air bases. The defenders were the Blue [NATO], who declared a general alert but did not return hostilities at first. Two days later, Orange initiated the use of chemical weapons and by the end of that day had used such weapons throughout ACE. All of these “events” were simply part of the written scenario. There had been three days of fighting and a deteriorating situation prior to the start of the exercise proper. This was desired because—as previously stated—the purpose of the exercise was to test procedures for transitioning from conventional to nuclear operations.
 In the exercise, as a result of Orange advance, its persistent use of chemical weapons, and its clear intentions to commit second echelon forces rapidly, SACEUR [NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe] requested political guidance on the use of nuclear weapons.
           The Soviet interpretation of the exercise could not have been further afield from the intention of the framers of Able Archer-83. Moscow Center sent a nearly frantic telegram to the London Center which was seen by the British spy, Oleg Gordievsky, and shown to MI-6:
 In view of the fact that the measures involved in State Orange [a nuclear attack within 36 hours] have to be carried out with the utmost secrecy (under the guise of maneuvers, training etc) in the shortest possible time, without disclosing the content of operational plans, it is highly probable that the battle alarm system may be used to prepare a surprise RYaN [nuclear attack] in peacetime
 On February 17, KGB Permanent Operational Assignment assigned its agents to monitor several possible indicators of a nuclear attack throughout the western world. These included any actions suggesting that there was a group associated with preparing and implementing decisions about RYaN—the KGB code name for a feared Western nuclear missile attack. They began a feverish surveillance and monitoring program of U.S. operating services, installations, and communications staffs. The 1983 NATO exercise introduced several new elements not seen in previous years, including a new, unique format of coded communication, radio silences, and the participation of heads of government.
 This increase in realism, combined with deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the anticipated arrival of Pershing II nuclear missiles in Europe, led some members of the Soviet Politburo and military to believe that Able Archer 83 was a ruse of war, obscuring preparations for a genuine nuclear first strike by NATO and the U.S.
 When no RYaN occurred, and the Able Archer-83 exercise came to its planned peaceful end, the Soviets heaved a sigh of genuine relief, and no one pulled the trigger. There must have been a good many officials on both sides who aged years during that fateful month. High schools in the United States often gloss over the angsts of the Cold War by describing it as a “stable balance of power” between the antagonistic east and west. The Able Archer exercise and the Soviet reaction to it was, in fact, an extremely dangerous period when the world was staring at the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. Most of the citizens of the world never knew a thing about it.
 Much the same scenario is possible in the confrontation between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the spring and summer of 2019. How heavy is the finger on the trigger? How stable and responsible are the leaders of the opposing nations and their military leaders?


Neurosurgeon turned Author who writes with Gripping Realism



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